In August 1991, General Asif Nawaz Janjua was appointed Pakistan’s Army Chief after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan declined to extend the tenure of the then-Army Chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg. General Janjua quickly established a reputation for his confidence and direct manner, distinguishing his leadership style from his predecessor.
Shortly after his appointment, General Janjua visited Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to attend the wedding of the son of Jamaat-e-Islami leader Qazi Ahmad. During this visit, a local parliamentarian, Haji Qadir Gul, questioned him about former Army Chief Aslam Beg. Janjua’s response was telling: “Mr. Haji, Aslam Beg’s time is over. His policies were his; ours are different. Our priorities are ours.” The remark reflected his clear intent to move beyond the policies of his predecessor.
In April 1992, General Janjua was again closely involved when Pakistan facilitated the formation of a transitional Afghan government. A key meeting was held at the Governor House in Peshawar, chaired by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Representatives of various Afghan mujahideen factions attended, though Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and elements of Pakistan’s ISI remained stationed outside Kabul.
During the Peshawar talks, a temporary political arrangement was decided: Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddedi would serve as Afghanistan’s interim president for two months, Hekmatyar would act as prime minister, and Ahmad Shah Massoud would be defense minister. After two months, Burhanuddin Rabbani was scheduled to assume the presidency. Despite these arrangements, tensions between rival factions made long-term stability impossible.
On April 28, 1992, Pakistani officials and journalists, including the author, flew to Kabul to oversee the implementation of the plan. The interim government was installed, but Massoud’s forces effectively blocked Hekmatyar from gaining control. This development forced Pakistan to accept Massoud’s authority as a political reality.
Observers note that Pakistan’s strategic depth policy, initiated under General Aslam Beg, envisioned a friendly Afghan government led by Hekmatyar. However, internal rivalries and the fragmented mujahideen environment made this goal unattainable. Subsequent years saw intense infighting among Afghan factions, leading to widespread destruction in Kabul and paving the way for the rise of the Taliban in 1996.
The period underscores the complexities of external influence in Afghan politics. Pakistan’s efforts, while ambitious, were undermined by local power dynamics and factional rivalries. Between 1992 and 1996, Kabul experienced devastating conflict, illustrating the limits of proxy interventions and the consequences of short-term political arrangements in a deeply divided society.
Sheraz akram paracha
